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Abstract 
 
     A unique feature of the financial crisis is the unprecedented collapse in global world trade. 
The objective of this paper is to explain some of that collapse as a move toward protectionism 
triggered not by nationalistic interests but by ‘competing’ objectives among trading partners 
from the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma. Even with the best of intentions, efforts toward internal 
rebalancing necessarily implies harming your trading partner unintentionally if they should be 
using conflicting policy objectives of the Trilemma. National interests are at odds between two 
such countries and their policy prescriptions counteract, and paralyze rebalancing and 
coordination efforts between nations. Policymakers may be forced into protectionists’ stances in 
an effort to counteract the internal rebalancing efforts of their neighbors. 
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The Collapse of Global Trade 
Introduction 
     As Barry Eichengreen points out in A Tale of Two Depressions   “World trade is falling much 
faster now than in 1929-30 (Figures 1 and 2). This has been highly alarming given the 
prominence attached in the historical literature to trade destruction as a factor compounding the 
Great Depression.” This synchronized and catastrophic drop in trade has been well documented 
by many; Barry Eichenberry (2009), Baldwin and Evenett (2009) (IMF 2009),  Araujo and 
Olivera Martins (2009) and in Richard Baldwin’s 2009 VOXEU eBook  to name a few.  
     A number of plausible and insightful explanations have been documented so far. Their focus 
is not just on causality but on the channels and propagation mechanisms as well.   
     The objective of this paper is to expand on an additional channel that may amplify the effects 
of a drop in global trade within our increasingly open and interconnected trading community.  
This paper will argue that conflicting policy objectives among trading partners stemming from 
the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma have helped make this drop in trade precipitous. Mundell-
Flemming Trilemma states that nations cannot simultaneously maintain free capital movement, 
an independent monetary policy and stable exchange rates. Nations may choose only two of the 
three policy objectives. When trading partners choose different and competing objectives they 
may be forced into protectionist stances in spite of the fact that policymakers are aware that 
maintaining open trade will play a prominent role in minimizing and ameliorating the effects of 
the macroeconomic collapse. 
     The move toward protectionism, though disconcerting, can be appreciated when one 
recognizes that often the conflict is triggered by clashing policy objectives from the Mundell-
Flemming Trilemma. Policymakers may be forced into protectionists measures. Conflict arises 
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due to the nature of the policy objectives chosen and the ensuing instruments. The ensuing policy 
instruments used to regain internal and external balance create unintended consequences that 
trigger retaliatory trade barriers from trading partners. This problem may be unavoidable as the 
policy instruments available to a country are limited and determined by the selection of policy 
objectives chosen from the Mundell-Flemming Trilemma. Even with the best of intentions, any 
effort toward internal rebalancing necessarily implies harming your trading partner 
unintentionally if they should be using conflicting policy objectives of the Trilemma. 
Instruments stemming from the clashing objectives counteract and paralyze trading partners in 
their rebalancing efforts. National interests are at odds between two such countries and the 
conflicting tools complicate coordination efforts. 
    The recent global upturn, though encouraging, does not provide much comfort.  Our Great 
Recession follows closely with a short term growth spurt in trade during the Great Depression of 
1929 (Figure 1), which unfortunately, was merely a pause in the downward trend. Additional 
concerns about the long term viability of trade growth focus on the inevitable reduction in 
supportive stimulus measures while private demand required to supplant the government support 
is wanting. Moreover, the degree to which stimulus measures were initially required has begun to 
raise new concerns regarding the ongoing sustainability of such support. In the face of these 
concerns it is not surprising then, that Simon Evenett’s (February 2010) study found that recent 
recovery and stabilization has not slowed the pace of protectionism. “In the last quarter of 2009 
almost every major trading nation has implemented discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests above trend levels.” This pace could well put a halt to our prospects for continued 
growth in world trade. We are not out of the woods yet. 
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          Section one will review the Mundell-Fleming model focusing on the Mundell-Fleming 
Trilemma. Section two will discuss the difficulty in coordination efforts that trigger the descent 
into the tangled web of protectionism by countries whose policy objectives from the Trilemma 
collide, compounding the complexities already inherent in cross country efforts to follow 
‘nurture’ rather than  ‘begger’ they neighbor policies. 
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Mundell-Fleming Model 
The Trilemma Policy Objectives 
     The Mundell-Fleming Trilemma is a useful framework that illustrates the tradeoffs countries 
face when seeking to maintain a stable exchange rate, free flowing capital mobility, and an 
autonomous monetary policy. This tradeoff is frequently referred to as “The Unholy Trinity” and 
states that a country cannot simultaneously (a)   maintain stable exchange rates (b) maintain an 
autonomous monetary policy and thereby control over their domestic interest rates, and (c) have 
free flowing capital into and out of the country. Countries must select precisely two of the three 
desirable options while sacrificing the third. The choice can be exacting and problematic.  
     Consider each option. The first option - exchange rate stability: Stable exchange rates can be 
particularly desirable for countries. The European Monetary Union was driven by a number of 
economic benefits but not trivial among them was the reduced exchange rate risk.  In the 1990 
special issue of European Economy the European Commission stated that a significant source of 
gains from the union would be the expectation of a reduction in the exchange rate risk that would 
reduce risk premium. This reduction in the cost of capital was expected to increase corporate 
investment.  High exchange rate volatility can seriously impede the markets and has been found 
to have a negative effect on bilateral trade flows (Dell’ Ariccia 1998). When exchange rates 
appreciate exporters are harmed by decreased demand. When exchange rates depreciate 
industries who import resources are harmed as domestic markets face higher international prices. 
If rates are low one year with a corresponding strong export market while the next year rates are 
high and exports low it can wreak havoc on international business plans discouraging long term 
investment. Moreover, such fluctuations can trigger internal business cycles.  Stable prices 
support a stable international trading environment. 
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     The second option – monetary policy autonomy: autonomy was a driving force during the 
Great Depression for leaving the gold standard, is a critical policy tool particularly during a 
macroeconomic collapse. Monetary autonomy provides the central bank with the freedom to use 
requisite tools for maintaining or regaining internal and external control over the economy 
primarily by allowing the bank to freely adjust interest rates or use other required monetary 
measures. This policy option has proved critical in preventing a complete collapse of the 
financial and commercial banking institutions during our current Great Recession. 
     The last option, international capital mobility, often referred to as full capital account 
convertibility  means that a country’s financial assets and liabilities can be converted without 
restraint and denominated into any currency at market exchange rates. It implies changes in 
ownership in local financial assets by anyone within the local country or by any foreign investor. 
Freely flowing capital is important to countries who are interested in financing investment with 
foreign capital, who are interested in investing abroad or simply maintaining day-to-day 
international business operations.  In today’s global economy, where much of the trade occurs 
among global supply chains, freely flowing capital mobility is crucial for global growth.   
     Although it is important to note that many countries are uncomfortable with open capital 
accounts and allowing uncontrolled freely flowing wealth into and out of their nations. Concerns 
include sudden movements of capital leaving the country from speculation. For example, foreign 
held debt can provide fuel for sudden capital flight. Externally held debt can be transformed 
quickly from inflows to outflows by awareness from foreign investors of an increased risk of a 
debt crisis due to the unsustainable levels of debt.  In the past, this has been particularly 
characteristic of emerging and developing nations. However, in today’s economic environment 
many investors are currently questioning the sustainability of the unfolding burgeoning debt of 
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developed countries where a sudden outflow of capital could result in a currency collapse and 
ultimately a default on the country’s debt spreading the crisis to those countries holding their 
debt. This is exactly the set of circumstances of the Asian countries in the late 1990’s and that is 
currently occurring within the European Union today.  Foreign borrowings can mutate from 
capital inflow to capital flight. This type of growth has been characterized as a “start-stop” 
growth pattern - abnormally high growth rates followed by quick damaging reversals with slow 
recoveries. It is interesting to note that both India and China were spared the Asian crisis and 
neither had full capital account convertibility. According to Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief 
Economist at the World Bank and a Nobel Laureate in 2001 “full capital account convertibility 
exposes an economy to extreme volatility due to “hot money” flows.” Developing countries that 
may not have well developed capital markets may be more willing to sacrifice unrestricted 
capital mobility and forgo the risks. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  has recently 
changed its policy of disfavour with any capital controls to identifying specific conditions under 
which controls on inflows (foreign purchases of domestic assets) may be warranted. Specifically 
as stated in their IMF Staff Position Note on the role of controls  
“if the economy is operating near potential, if the level of reserves is adequate, if the 
exchange rate is not undervalued, and if the flows are likely to be transitory, then use of 
capital controls—in addition to both prudential and macroeconomic policy—is justified as 
part of the policy toolkit to manage inflows.” (Ostry, Ghosh, et al 2010)          
 
Notwithstanding, even several developed countries have moved away from freely flowing capital 
Trilemma policy option and have implemented capital controls on outflows,  the United States is 
one such example.1  
 
     Whether to choose the policy option of freely flowing capital into and out of the country can 
be problematic. But should a country choose to implement capital controls will require a 
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concurrent selection of the remaining two policy options - fixed exchange rates and autonomous 
monetary policy.  
     The message here is that each policy option in the Trilemma can be desirable and selection of 
any two depends on the unique economic circumstances faced by the nation state and the choice 
can be exacting. 
 
The Trilemma Policy Instruments     
      According the Mundel-Fleming Trilemma, countries may only chose two of the three 
objectives stable exchange rates, autonomous monetary policy, free flowing capital into and out 
of the country. However, from the policy objectives chosen by a country one can infer a 
corresponding set of policy instruments; and from specific policy instruments one can infer a 
corresponding set of economic tools that will support these instruments. Both the instruments 
and the tools depend on the chosen policy objective. Let’s take a closer look. 
                                                     Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Autonomous Monetary Policy                                                  Unrestricted Capital Mobility   
                        (AMP)                                                                                                          (UCM) 
                                                      
                                                                    Figure 3 
 
           The chosen set of policy objectives (identified at each corner) determine which side of the 
triangle policy makers will operate.  Moreover, it will also determine a set of specific economic 
policy instruments (identified on each side of the triangle) the country can expect to employ in 
 Capital Controls Fixed Exchange Rates 
Floating Exchange Rates 
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correcting economic imbalances. Countries that chose Autonomous Monetary Policy (AMP) and 
Unrestricted Capital Mobility (UCM) engage in the floating exchange rate regimes. Similarly, 
countries that opt for Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) and Unrestricted Capital Mobility will 
engage in a fixed exchange rate instrument. But what is more pivotal according to the Mundell-
Fleming model, is that each exchange rate regime limits the economic tools available to policy 
makers in correcting economic imbalances. 
 
Floating Exchange Rates: Monetary Policy vs. the Fiscal Policy 
     According to the Mundell-Fleming model, monetary policies are more likely to result in 
successful stabilization efforts than a fiscal policy within a floating exchange rate regime; while 
the fiscal policy will be more successful in stabilization efforts within a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  
     Consider first, the monetary policy under floating rates. The channels are well known. An 
expansionary monetary policy increases the money supply, since the currency is floating it 
depreciates. This causes domestic products to become more competitive abroad increasing 
aggregate net exports and thereby increasing the country’s aggregate output. Expansionary 
monetary policies have powerful short run effects in a floating exchange rate regime.  
Specifically, the net effect is a shift in demand away from foreign goods and services to domestic 
goods and services encouraging economic growth.   
     Consider now the fiscal policy, again, under a floating regime. These effects will be more 
benign. Increased government purchases results in an increase in aggregate income and demand 
which increases money demand and thus interest rates. Foreign capital flows into the country 
seeking the returns from higher interest rates, triggering an appreciation of the nominal exchange 
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rates and a corresponding decrease in exports. The decrease in exports counteracts the initial 
increase in demand, ultimately, minimizing the impact on aggregate output.  In other words, a 
fiscal expansion would increase demand increasing money demand raising interest rates and 
putting upward pressure on the exchange rate decreasing net exports and therefore aggregate 
output.  Thus a Keynesian fiscal policy under a floating exchange rate regime has a limited effect 
on the economy. Aggregate demand may increase but at the expense of a decrease in net exports. 
 
Fixed Exchange Rates:  Monetary Policy vs. the Fiscal Policy 
     Similar arguments can be made for a monetary and fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. However, in this case the opposite holds true; fiscal policies will have more a robust 
impact on the economy while monetary policies will be more benign.  
     Consider an expansionary monetary policy under fixed exchange rates. The currency cannot 
act as a counter balancing measure. A monetary policy is not an effective option to the central 
bank under a fixed exchange rate regime as an increase in the money supply causes depreciation 
in currency values and a corresponding need to sterilize the initial expansionary policy 
transactions by a contractionary policy in order to appreciate the currency to its original fixed 
level.   
     Another way to view the same argument is that with fixed exchange rates and no capital 
controls domestic, foreign interest rates must be equal or else arbitrage will take place until it is 
equal.  This implies that no independent monetary policy is possible since independence means 
by definition that central banks can change interest rates.  
     Now consider an expansionary fiscal policy with a fixed exchange rate regime. An 
expansionary fiscal policy would increase aggregate demand. Again, this would cause an 
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increase in money demand and a corresponding increase in interest rates and thus an increase in 
the exchange rates.  But now, the central bank must correct the increased exchange rate by 
increasing the money supply in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate values. This would 
cause aggregate output to increase resulting in more robust results in an expansionary fiscal 
policy. Under fixed exchange rates the monetary policy cannot be used to affect output while the 
fiscal policies are effective. Table 1 summarizes the results.    
 
The Tangled Web of Protectionism 
     The Mundell-Flemming Trilemma states that the policy objectives of an Autonomous 
Monetary Policy  and Unrestricted Capital Mobility (AMP/UCM) implies a policy instrument of a 
floating exchange rate regime which further implies the use of the economic tools of the 
monetary policy for internal and external balancing. In addition, the Trilemma establishes that 
the policy objectives of Exchange Rate Stability and Unrestricted Capital Mobility implies a 
policy instrument of a fixed exchange rate regime which further implies the use of the economic 
tools of the fiscal policy for internal and external balancing of the country. AMP/UCM 
corresponds to the bottom leg of the Mundel Triangle while ERS/UCM corresponds to the right 
leg of the triangle. The left leg characterizes a country that has chosen Stable Exchange Rates 
coupled with Autonomous Monetary Policy - implying closed capital accounts such as has 
typified Chinese policies until recently.  This policy instrument requires policy tools that require 
ongoing federal interference in maintaining fixed exchange rates characteristic of strong capital 
controls. 
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The Web of Protectionism 
     The next step is to look at the implications among trading partners when each subscribe to a 
different set of policy objectives and are implementing different policy instruments to correct 
imbalances within their respective nations following a global downturn. 
     To appreciate the challenge, consider countries with competing objectives as they begin the 
arduous and daunting task of regaining internal and external balance. Now their initial intent may 
not be to cause harm to their neighbors. Unfortunately, the very fact that they have chosen policy 
objectives in conflict with trading partners, results in policy prescriptions that could trigger 
protectionist measures.  
      
Autonomous Monetary Policy and Unrestricted Capital Mobility AMP/UCM 
     Consider those countries that have chosen an AMP/UCM and as a result engage in a Floating 
Exchange Rate regime. These countries are free to aggressively pursue expansionary monetary 
policy. Indeed, in our current crisis, expansionary policies have been promoted by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an effort to avoid protectionism. The idea behind the 
policy is to minimize incentives toward barriers to trade by increasing world demand and output. 
In this case an expansionary monetary policy increases the money supply reducing interest rates, 
lowering the exchange rates, increasing net exports (due to increased demand from lower prices) 
and finally increasing output and demand. Yet, if a floating exchange rate regime pursues such a 
policy within a country the consequences may not increase aggregate worldwide demand. Rather, 
it is more likely to shift demand from foreign to domestic products increasing demand internally 
but at the expense of their trading partners. The question is which impact dominates – the 
induced growth or the impact of currency depreciation. If depreciation dominates, as it did 
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during the depression (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985) the policy acts as an indirect trade tariff 
triggering at a minimum disgruntled trading neighbors and at a maximum retaliatory responses 
and a worldwide move toward protectionism.  
“A devaluation is economically equivalent to an import tariff plus and export subsidy, 
except it is better than a tariff alone because it gives monetary policy the flexibility to 
boost domestic demand in times of recession” (Irwin 2009).  
 
     This can and has triggered a scramble and at times an apparent chaotic scramble toward 
retaliatory protectionist measures.  Countries are forced to create barriers to trade during global 
downturns in order to avoid the deleterious consequences of policy instruments in use from 
trading nations who have chosen alternative policy objectives.  
     This is exactly what occurred during the Great Depression. According to Eichengreen and 
Irwin (2009) “Countries remaining on the gold standard and thereby prevented from using 
monetary stimulus to reflate were more inclined to resort to trade restrictions” (Eichengreen 
Irwin 2009). Eichengreen and Irwin argue that those that ‘delinked’ early from the gold standard 
regained internal balance and experience relatively mild recessions. If everyone had left the gold 
standard and the “restrictive monetary policies associated with it” all would have enjoyed a 
relatively mild recession.  
     While their research is highly informative, I argue against their conclusion and suggest 
instead that had everyone delinked, all countries would have been sharing the same policy 
objectives and instruments and would have been unable to ‘lure’ trade in their direction at the 
expense of those countries that could not use exchange rates as protectionist policies. All 
countries would have been forced to negotiate the sharing of the burden of recovery at the 
negotiation table. No recovery is free; the tough questions revolve around how to share the 
burden. Until this is formally addressed, apparent subversive measures may be taken where 
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coordination fails.  As it were, it is possible that those who remained on the gold standard during 
the depression ended up bearing the brunt of recovery.  
     Eichengreen and Irwin’s narrative of the colossal and chaotic move toward protectionism can 
be seen clearly with the use of the Mundel-Fleming framework. The spark that flamed the chaos 
began with a devaluation of the franc and an increase in interest rates by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Both policies triggered an inflow of gold into France and the US. With the fiscal policy 
unknown and an ineffective monetary policy for those on the gold standard there was little 
recourse left. Countries could delink from gold and engage in expansionary monetary policies 
(thereby adopting the very same policy objectives of all countries that had delinked) or they 
could implement countervailing measures such as tariffs, capital controls or other transparent 
barriers to trade. The important point here is that those that engaged in the more transparent 
barriers were no more or less guilty than those that delinked and engaged in the less transparent 
expansionary monetary policies that resulted in currency depreciations. It is just a matter of 
which policy objectives and instruments the country had at its disposal. Both parties are equally 
guilty of non-cooperation.  
    The message here is that , monetary policy stimulation could trigger retaliatory responses 
should the effects of exchange rate depreciation dominate the effects of an increase in the money 
supply resulting in little to no or even negative effects in aggregate demand or output.  
 
Exchange Rate Stability and Unrestricted Capital Mobility ERS/UCM  
      Now consider those countries that choose Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) and Unrestricted 
Capital Mobility (UCM)   and the corresponding fixed exchange rate policy instrument of a 
fiscal stimulus. Will a fiscal stimulus result in worldwide growth and demand as hoped for by the 
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IMF? According to the Mundel-Fleming model, again, it may not.  Under a fixed exchange rate a 
fiscal stimulus and the resultant increase in income and demand, could result in an increase in 
imports. This has the potential to trigger domestic dissent internally as increased imports 
amounts to currency flowing out of the country and supporting a recovery for other nations at the 
domestic taxpayers’ expense and ballooning budget deficits. 
“The problem .....  is that the country applying the stimulus worries that benefits will spill 
out to its neighbors, who are free riding. Fiscal stimulus is not costless; it means incurring 
public debt that will have to be serviced by the children and grandchildren of the citizens of 
the country initiating the policy. ….there is that temptation for that country to resort to 
“Buy America” provisions. .. The protectionist dangers are still there… it is the active 
rather than the passive country that is subject to the temptation.” Eichengreen (Jul 2009) 
  
     Fiscal policies have the potential to trigger internal protectionist measures with moves toward 
implementing fiscal packages that guarantee local taxes stay with the borders. There are many 
‘murky’ methods today for implementing barriers: subsidies to industries that have been hard hit 
by the downturn for example the automobile industry, riders attached to legislation that stipulate 
“Buy Locally” 
     Again these nations with a ERS/UCM policy are forced to implement the fiscal policy as their 
primary means to mitigate the downturn.  And while policy makers may honestly attempt to 
prevent protectionist measures from being buried in domestic legislation they may secretly 
begrudge the negative impact of the depreciating currency from those who hold the competing 
AMR/UCM policy objectives. Such depreciation from their trading partners leaves them paralyzed 
with inaction in preventing their country from bearing the worldwide cost of the downturn. Trade 
barriers are their only tool to counteract depreciating currencies abroad.  
    When the objectives compete, it leaves trading partners paralyzed with inaction with no ability 
to counteract the ‘unintended consequences’ because they do not have effective instruments 
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available to them to counter the measures of trading partners using alternative policy 
instruments. They are strapped within the confines of their chosen Trilemma objectives. The 
ERS/UCM country cannot continually depreciate their currency in an attempt to keep up with the 
depreciation for to do so is in essence adopting the very same policy objectives and turning to a 
float. Their only other alternatives are barriers to trade or simply suffer the consequences and pay 
for the recovery of other nations at their expense. From the perspective of the ERS/UCM country, 
implementing tariffs or other protectionist measures is simply a retaliatory response to the 
protectionist measure of devaluation.    
    In essence, under a floating exchange rate regime the fiscal policy is benign and the most 
effective tool available is the monetary policy. It is the primary tool available to the AMP/UCM 
country to correct for imbalances. Unfortunately, expansionary monetary policies results in 
currency depreciation which shifts global demand toward their own domestic goods at the 
expense of trading partners. This forces trading partners to bear the cost of the global downturn 
with the potential of triggering a retaliatory response and a collapse in global trade.   
     Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary policy is benign while the most effect tool 
available is the fiscal policy. It is the primary tool available to the ERS/UCM country to correct 
for imbalances. Unfortunately, a fiscal policy that increases demand increases imports. This has 
the potential to trigger a move toward protectionism through internal dissent as taxpayers watch 
their debt explode while their fiscal currency is used to support their neighbor’s recovery. Often, 
to discourage tax dollars from leaving the country, legislation is added that ensures fiscal dollars 
remain within the domestic economy. Thus, fiscal policies are likely to create incentives to erect 
tariffs, import quotas or other trade barriers in an attempt to obtain the full effects of tax payer’s 
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fiscal sacrifices - with the potential of triggering a retaliatory response and a collapse in global 
trade.   
     Since fiscal and monetary tools have very different effects on countries depending on the 
selection of the policy objectives chosen from the Trilemma, countries are cornered into their 
protectionist stances simply in an effort to correct economic collapse. It is important to recognize 
that both tools can create incentives for engaging in protectionist measures.  And it is not 
necessarily due to subversive tactics but simply the byproduct of policy instruments meant to 
restore economic growth but that may nonetheless evolve and escalate into retaliatory and 
subversive trade protectionist measures.   
    Ultimately, the real culprit is the lack of understanding of what creates the chaos and tangled 
web. Countries are responding to the crisis at cross purposes and with different objectives. When 
the global community faces a downturn in unison it is difficult and challenging to determine how 
and who will or should share in the burden, for when everyone is facing the same 
macroeconomic collapse there is no escape hatch because everyone is facing the same losses and 
running for the same exits in tandem. Until the issue of how and who should share the burden is 
formally addressed the world faces grave danger of returning to the tangled web of descent into 
trade barriers once more.  
 
The Overwhelming Complexities of the Consequences of Policy Options 
     Finally, the degree to which both global current accounts and the capital account have opened 
and expanded globally creates increasingly strong incentives for protectionist stances during 
downturns. An open capital account leaves a country more vulnerable to sudden outflows of 
capital. During a macroeconomic collapse, countries are more prone to sudden reversals in 
-19- 
Ann Spehar: Copyright 2010  
capital flows. The more open the capital account, the more pressure is imposed on the country’s 
financial system and the more likely the country will resort to protective measures.  
     Figure 4 provides evidence of the growth in the openness of capital accounts over the past 
four decades. Beginning in the  early 1990s there has been a remarkable increase toward  
international financial trade. With financial interests interlocked with so many other countries 
that are equally precariously balanced there is much at stake when engaging in policy 
prescriptions. The additional level of complexity resulting from conflicting policy objectives and 
instruments within the international community one might expect an increased desire to 
disengage from trade in order to regain the freedom to move about within the confines of their 
own policy space in an effort to minimize collateral damage during a macroeconomic collapse. 
And this increase in desire to disengage may be proportional to the degree in which countries 
have opened the doors to trade and international finance. With so much at stake and with so 
much of their fate intertwined we should expect to see an increase in the responsiveness and 
sensitivity to movements in national debt, expectations, demand, interest rates, and any sign of 
capital flight. The complexities are overwhelming and the consequences of a misguided policy 
response could result in unforgiving consequences. The desire to disengage to simplify the policy 
options, minimize risk and thereby allow the country the freedom to minimize potential 
unintended consequences of instruments is more plausible than the standard response that 
countries suddenly become myopic and ethnocentric. Most statesmen know full well the 
consequences of a protectionist policy and are likely to avoid this course of action until all other 
policy options have been exhausted. Many may take the “wait and see” approach until 
transparency, well defined risk and a more rational, stable world financial architecture is in 
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place. This may be among their least intrusive and even their best options - minimize or avoid 
uncertain, unapparent collateral damage in such a complex intertwined global trading milieu.  
     The volatility in the movement of capital account openness as evidenced in Figure 5 suggests 
that countries policy response is to disengage during economic downturns.  The Chinn-Ito index 
used in generating Figures 4 and 5 is a measure of financial openness based on policy positions. 
Detailed in the Appendix, these Figures are derived from a policy based index unlike previous 
price based indices that measure capital account openness. The Chinn-Ito index is regulatory in 
nature and thus provides a reasoned measure of a country’s international financial trade position. 
Figure 5 makes evident the cyclical behavior around the trend in the growth in capital account 
openness over the past four decades. The sudden downturn in the movement of global financial 
liberalization in recent years may provide evidence of a change in global policy toward open 
capital accounts.  
     Figure 5 also makes apparent that along with the growth in financial openness in the 1990’s 
has come an increase in volatility in the cyclical behavior of financial openness globally. This 
volatility may be due to the financial crises that have occurred during this decade2 and may help 
explain the current pattern in the unprecedented decline in world financial liberalization now 
occurring. 
      In short, when crises occur, my argument is that the conflicting Trilemma policy mix among 
countries force nations into isolationist stances. Their best alternative in order to avoid 
unintended international consequences of their policy prescriptions is that of minimizing 
international financial engagement altogether thereby minimizing the friction that could trigger 
and escalate a steep decline into the morass of trade protection which ultimately harms everyone.  
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Summary 
World Trade Organization and Protectionism 
     In closing, I would like to applaud the efforts of The World Trade Organization (WTO) who 
have kept everyone abreast of the movements of protectionist measures within our global 
community. But according to the Center for Economic Policy Research, at the World Bank-
CEPR conference in Brussels in May 2009 the world faces its biggest challenge in 2010. The 
many subversive and ‘murky’ methods of implementing trade barriers were outlined in the 
conference and there is concern that as policy choices narrow incentives increase toward 
protectionist measures. The report called for increased vigilance. Unemployment has not eased 
and historically protectionist measures are procyclical with unemployment rates. While many 
stimulus packages are in development and while policy options are narrowing there is still ample 
time for benign internal balancing prescriptions to result in unintended consequences triggering a 
“massive slide into protectionism”. 
     If we are to contain the secondary effects of this crisis, we will need to remain vigilant at 
minimizing any incentives for moving in the direction of protectionism. It must begin with the 
global community addressing in unison the challenge of how and who will or should share in the 
burden. There is no escape hatch and for countries who believe they can ‘go it alone’ stand to 
trigger a global collapse in trade where everyone suffers. The issue will be addressed either 
formally at the negotiating table or informally and chaotically as occurred during the Great 
Depression. Until the issue of how and who should share the burden is formally addressed the 
world faces grave danger of repeating history and descending into the tangled web of trade 
barriers once more. 
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Appendix 
Description of Chinn-Ito Capital Account Openness Data Series 
     The Chinn-Ito data set is a broad measure of a country’s degree of capital account openness 
and financial liberalization. While the dataset includes the time period of 1970-2006 for 182 
countries, only 123 countries were selected from the Chinn-Ito file due to discontinuous data.  
     The data represents de jure controls on capital transactions with a mean of zero and range of 
(-3,3) .  
     The objective of this index is to capture both intensity and direction of capital controls. The 
file contains country, year and the ‘ kaopen’ index.  Kaopen is a binary dummy variable that 
codifies restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The codification involves the below 
dummy variables that identify restrictions place on four major categories of foreign accounts: 
• k1: presence of multiple exchange rates; 
• k2: restrictions on current account transactions; 
• k3: restrictions on capital account transactions; and 
• k4: the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 
Notice that this index differs from ‘price-based indices such as interest rate parity measures that are 
typically de facto measures on financial global openness. While any measure of capital account 
openness contains it own quantitative problems with coverage and accuracy, the strength of the 
Chinn-Ito data set is its focus on the regulatory nature of capital account openness and represents a de 
jure measure.  
     Chinn-Ito data series was collapsed by year taking the mean across countries before applying 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The summary results are provided below.  
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Summary of  year kaopen 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean      Std. Dev.       Min           Max 
   -------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           year |        37        1988        10.82436       1970          2006 
      kaopen |        37   -.0472392    .3187506    -.3753164   .5468727 
 
 
     The 123 countries from the Chinn-Ito file were used in the analysis.  
     For greater detail on the data set see Ito, Hiro and Chinn, Menzie, A New Measure of 
Financial Openness, JEL Classification Nos.: F33, G28 May 23, 2007 
 
Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
     Figures 4 and 5 apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to the Chinn-Ito capital account data 
series. The HP filter is one of several popular trend-cycle decomposition filters used in 
macroeconomics.  It was first applied to economic data by Robert J. Hodrick and Edward C. 
Prescott, Nobel Prize winner in Economics in 2004 "for  contributions to dynamic 
macroeconomics”. The Hodrick-Prescott (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) filter, although the subject 
of intense criticism, has stood the test of time and remains one of the standard methods for 
removing trend and cyclical components in a business cycle or in macroeconomic time series 
data in general. It remains a steadfast tool to modern economists due to its ability to be applied to 
nonstationary time series (up to four unit roots).  Aggregate macroeconomic time series is 
characteristically nonstationary, hence its popularity. The Chinn-Ito data set was Differenced 
Stationary and thus had one unit root.  
     Conceptually, it decomposes economic series into the sum of trend and cyclical components. 
The cyclical component is considered a transitory deviation from the trend which is classified as 
a ‘cycle’. 
 
                                                                                                                                     (1) 
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     However, as the constituent parts of    - the trend (  ) and cycle (  )  - are not observable, 
the decomposition derives the trend and cycle by solving the below minimization problem 
subject to a penalty constraint: 
 
                             min   x


 τ 
2   
-λ  τ


 τ -  τ  τ] 2                           (2) 
                                              Goodness of fit                       Penalty Constraint 
where the ‘smoothing’ parameter λ approximates the actual series xt as   0  and approximates 
a linear  trend as   ∞  .  Hodrick and Prescott suggest values for λ for monthly, quarterly and 
yearly data of 16,000 ,  14,400 , 100 respectively. However, others such as Ravn and Uhlig have 
suggested values of   129,600, 14,400 and 6.25 respectively. For the Chinn-Ito index capital 
account openness index, I used the λ smoothing value of 6.25 
 
     The first sum in equation (2) minimizes the difference between the data and its growth 
component ( its cyclical component  )  while the penalty component minimizes the second-
order difference of the growth component,  or the second derivative of the growth component. 
The lambda is used to weight the two components. The larger lambda the more the HP trend is 
constrained to be linear. While the closer lambda is to zero the more the minimization problem 
reduces to minimizing only the first summation which is simply a linear trend estimated with a 
standard regression.  Intermediate values allows lambda to move between a smooth linear trend 
(large values  λ )  and one that shows the  more variation in the data (small values of λ). 
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Footnotes 
1
 The United States have implemented capital controls with the passing of HR 2847. page 27 of  
HR 2847 ‘‘Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act’’ (HIRE):   Offset Provisions - Subtitle A—
Foreign Account Tax Compliance, which requires foreign banks to withhold 30% of all outgoing 
capital flows  while disclosing all details of non-exempt account-holders.  
     Reasons for implementing controls on outflows during crises include 1.) the need to correct a 
balance of payments deficit 2.) need to generate revenue while financing the recovery 3.) and ‘to 
preserve savings for domestic use to ensure that the benefits of investments in economy accrue to 
domestic savers’ (Neely 1999) 
 
2
 For example: 1995 Japanese Crisis, 1998 Russia Crisis, 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 1999 US - dot-com crisis 
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TABLE 1 
 
TYPE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Float Fixed 
Impact On: 
Yes 
Exchange 
Rate 
Net-
Export 
Yes 
Exchange 
Rate 
Net-
Export 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
0 ↑ ↓ ↑ 0 0 
Monetary 
Expansion 
↑ ↓ ↑ 0 0 0 
Import 
Expansion 
0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Volume of World Trade, Now vs Then. 
 
Source: Eichengreen,Barry and O’Rouke,Kevin  A Tale of Two Depressions, 
 retrieved 7 July 2010  http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421 
Data covers up to February 2010 
Eichengreen and O’Rouke sources: League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 
http://www.cpb.nl/eng/research/sector2/data/trademonitor.html 
 
 Figure 2     World Imports 1965-2009 
 
Source: OECD Quarterly real trade data.  Baldwin, Richard,  
The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects 2009 
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Figures 4 and 5 below use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter applied to the Chinn-Ito capital 
account data series (kaopen) using λ=6.25 (see Appendix for details on how Figure 4 and 5 were 
generated) 
 
Figure 4 Trend Component of Capital Account Openness Index 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Cyclical Component of Capital Account Openness Index 
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